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T'pE political sociology of the business corporation hardly sounds
promising as a topic for popular, or even semi-popular, con-
sumption. But in the last few years, a stream of more or less
scholarly literature on the subject has caught the fancy of the
public in an astonishing way-some of it even rising to the dizzy
heights of paperbackdom. 1 Not all these works are in full agree-
ment, nor are they identical in emphasis. They are close enough
together, however, to permit a composite to be drawn of their view
of the world of the big company and the individual.
Corporations are big and growing bigger. Shareholders have
been disenfranchised and no longer control these corporations.
Control now rests in the hands of some 500 or 1,000 professional
managers, members of a self-perpetuating power elite, who do not
themselves have great property holdings. These men are account-
able to no one for their vast power. Though this is obviously a
dangerous situation, matters are not yet immediately critical. This
is partly because the managers of the corporations are to some
extent curbed by the looming presence of other organizations with
countervailing power. In part they are curbed by general public
opinion, by law, and their own internal desire to be good citizens.
Perhaps the growing pension and mutual funds will step in with
their new big blocks of stock to hold the corporate managers in
line and make them accountable to the various constituencies to
which they owe responsibility--consumers, shareholders, lenders,
suppliers, purchasers, workers, etc. But the basic picture is one
of ominous concentration of power in the hands of a few hundred
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men, sitting at the controls of corporate engines of billion dollar
thrust. Against such Corporate Power, the individual is powerless;
his freedom stands in jeopardy.
This Actonian concept of Corporate Power has an undoubted
appeal. It conforms to our pre-impressions. It makes our min-
now's blood race a bit to contemplate the silent Titans towering
among us. A synthesis of economics and evangelism, phrased in
classic American terms, the Corporate Power thesis has served to
draw attention to centralized economic aggregations in modern
America. On this score we are in its debt. And the main point
of the argument is unquestionably valid: traditional descriptions
of the business enterprise in America are obsolete and false.
The question is: now what? As every successful revolutionist
has learned, the grand poetic vision that inspires the Movement
proves of small use when day to day action decisions are to be
made. Effective poetry must be general but action is always par-
ticular. Now that we have been helped to an awareness of new
problems by the literature on Corporate Power, how well will it guide
us in deciding what to do? The thesis of this paper is that it will
help very little, that we shall make small progress until we abandon
an essentially poetic level of discourse in favor of a more concrete
and particularized analysis.
This paper is titled "Corporate Power and Individual Freedom"
because in the view of the author, the problem at hand is not
"Corporate," is not one of "Power," and is not, so far as we are
now in a position to say, a problem of "Individual Freedom."
Corporate?
The Corporate Power literature is unanimous that the problem-
at hand is a problem of corporations. But is it really the "corpo-
ration" that concerns us?
A "corporation" is a legal form in which men do business. It is
one legal form of doing business just as, to name a few others,
the limited partnership, the partnership, the joint stock company,
the joint venture, the Massachusetts Trust, the societ6 anonime,
the Gesetzgebund Managieren Beshrankten Haftung and the
Sociedad de Responsibilidad Limitada are legal forms of doing
business. A "corporation" is a way of filing papers, attended by
certain more or less predictable special legal consequences of an
increasingly narrow significance. A "corporation" is not an organ-
ization of men or an economic unit; it is one of many possible legal
categories by which, for limited legal purposes, we distinguish cer-
tain organizations of men. If our freedoms are jeopardized by
General Motors, it is not because General Motors is a "corporation."
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It is because General Motors is a vast centralized economic and
social organization, whatever its legal form under American or
foreign law.
For a variety of reasons most of our major economic organiza-
tions today happen to be in the form we call stock corporations.
But many of them are not; witness the unions, the powerful citrus
growers cooperatives, the sprawling partnerships of accountants
nationally and internationally interlocked, the vast new real estate
syndicates in the form of limited partnerships, and the vaulting
accumulations of wealth centering in non-stock corporations and
trusts. If any of these poses a social problem, it is a result of the
size of its economic leverage, not a consequence of the legal form
through which that leverage is exercised. The other side of the
same proposition is that probably 90% of all businesses operating in
corporate form are closely held, corner grocery store affairs-made
no more formidable by filing articles of incorporation with the local
Secretary of State's office.
It is important that we stop thinking of the problem of economic
concentration as though it were a problem of "corporations." The
reason is not an urge for semantic nicety. There is no cause to com-
plain against anti-monopoly laws being called "anti-trust laws" so
long as no one seriously thinks the problem has anything to do
with trusts or trust law. But in the present field, rudimentary
mis-description-misidentification of the human organization with
the legal form-has led many writers to think, and more readers
to assume, that the forces at work are in some way involved with
the accidents of the legal structure, the legal theory, and the legal
history of the "corporation."
In its worst manifestation, concentration on the "corporation"
has led some commentators off into a medieval spirit-hunt in a
murky wilderness of "corporateness"-and inspired some to find
a social significance in the asserted "nature" of the corporation
as an "entity" or "person" and in its alleged perpetual existence.
Fortunately writing of this stripe is no longer common.
The more common disease carried by the "corporation" bug,
however, is not platonism, but irrelevance. It tempts us to focus
upon the peculiar internal aspects of the corporate form rather
than upon the impact of the enterprise upon society. An endlessly
repeated theme of current literature on the individual and big in-
dustry is that shareholders no longer control the management. This
conclusion is commonly elaborated in extended discussions of
shareholder voting rights, the asserted disenfranchisement of share-
holders and the ineffectiveness of the proxy electoral system. The
conclusion is that since managements are no longer restrained by
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shareholders, are no longer "accountable" to them-the social threat
of the corporation is greatly increased.
From this line of analysis it is usually argued that we must re-
double our efforts to restore, or impose, something called Share-
holder Democracy. I have argued elsewhere, at some length, that
this crusade is misdirected, romantic and certain to continue to
fail.2 The point of importance here, however, is different. Assum-
ing the facts of shareholder impotency, in what way is the problem
of the disenfranchised shareholder relevant to the question of the
corporate threat to the rest of society? It is relevant if, but only if,
it is assumed that shareholders when in power keep managers
in line to the benefit of all society, i.e., if there is a substantial
community of interest between the shareholders and the other
groups affected by the corporation's actions.
Is there any basis for such an assumption? Are managers who
are under the thumb of shareholders less disposed to threaten the
freedoms of the rest of us, and vice versa? The management of
Ford Motor Company is immediately identified with the will of
its major voting shareholders, the Ford family; this has been to
a lesser extent true in the case of General Motors and the Dupont
phyle; it is not at all true in the case of publicly held AT&T. Is
there any evidence or argument that our society is more safe at
the hands of the Ford Motor Company than at the hands of Gen-
eral Motors or AT&T? So far as I am aware, the literature offers
none.
Just to underscore the point, the possibility should be consid-
ered that the public may be less in jeopardy from a large busi-
ness enterprise run by an unpropertied professional management-
one said not to be "accountable"-than from a large enterprise
personally owned and operated by an individual or a small family
group. To whom is such an individual or small family group "ac-
countable?" It is perhaps unfair to recall that before World
War II the managers of the basic industry of Germany and of
Japan were directly "accountable" to their shareholders-the
Krupps and the four Zaibatsu families.
Overconcentration on the legal form and internal categories of
the corporate form is apt to produce some strange refractions.
On the topic of the relations between shareholders and managers,
an important point of historical perspective has been put to odd use.
In our basic industrial organization, we are doubtless moving
out of a system that can be adequately described in terms of "prop-
erty." By a series of semi-conscious mechanisms, we have diluted
2. Manning, Book Review, 67 YA.LE L.J. 1477 (1958). The review is of a piece
with the present article and may be considered a part of it.
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beyond recognition the whole concept and significance of "owner-
ship" in large scale enterprise; no one "owns" AT&T in any classi-
cal sense of the term, any more than anyone "owns" the TVA.
Marx was right in thinking that something would happen to halt
the progressive concentration of the 19th century "ownership"
of basic elements of production in the hands of a few. But it did
not necessarily follow that "ownership" had to go to the state;
another possibility was that "ownership" might just disappear as
a relevant concept in dealing with the basic resources and organ-
izational structures of a society. The last, and perhaps the next,
century will be seen by future historians as a period of wide-rang-
ing social experimentation in search of workable legal and organ-
izational arrangements for supplanting the "ownership" concept
in a mass-production society.
This important general observation has been assigned an unusual
role in one version of the shareholder disenfranchisement thesis.
It is first noted that power today-Corporate Power in particular-
is no longer linked to property. By this loss, it is said, power has
lost its socially approved basis for authority, its "legitimacy."
Corporate Power has therefore become illegitimate power, and we
must be alarmed at the threat of the corporation and the unlegiti-
mated acts of an unpropertied management, no longer "account-
able" to propertied shareholders, the owners.
This involuted-Marx-upside-down-argument is not easy to get
hold of. It assumes what must be challenged-that the rest of
society need not worry about corporations so long as the "owners"
are running them. Then it challenges what may be assumed-that
corporate policies socially satisfactory when set by shareholders
are no less so when set by others. The argument is based on a
priori conceptions of right and legitimacy in a particular distribu-
tion of decision-making power within the corporate legal structure.
Our concern about the large business enterprise is made to hinge
upon the degree of dislocation from this ordained internal legal
order, rather than upon the functional social consequences of corpo-
rate policies. Again we forsake substance for form.
There is still one more powerful reason why problems of aggre-
gated economic organizations cannot be adequately handled in
terms of "corporations." Precisely because "corporation" is only
the name of a legal form, and because it is a term on a very high
level of abstraction, it serves admirably to conceal the real actors
in a given situation. In most of the literature in the field, refer-
ences to the "corporation" probably mean the corporate manage-
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ment group (whoever that may be) of large enterprises (somehow
defined). But at any given time or on any given issue, the voice
heard by the public as the voice of the "corporation" may be that
of the board of directors, or of the senior management, or a re-
bellious junior management, or the shareholders, or a particular
class of shareholders or other producers in the field, or suppliers,
or a union, or the government--or some faction of any of these.
And not only do the nation's corporations range in size from the
local barbershop to AT&T, but they reveal an astonishing variety
in internal structures, administrative relationships, business and
non-business policies, and economic and political influence. The
accident of their legal form offers no rational basis for classifica-
tion. Surely we can-and if we wish to be effective, we must-do
something better in localizing the sources of our concerns than
to point to "corporations."
Threats to freedom require threateners. A legal form never
threatened anybody. If we are not concerned about "corporations"
as social threats, what are we concerned about in this field?
There is no term in general use to designate the kind of institu-
tion we have in mind. For now, let us call it, or them, something
totally neutral-say Alpha Institutions-and prescribe as the main
features of an Alpha Institution centralized control, large scale
organization, substantial capital resources and relative independ-
ence of formally constituted government. It will be readily seen
that even this classification, though a marked advance over "cor-
poration," is too general to be useful. We shall have to classify
further among Alpha Institutions, depending upon our particular
center of interest, whether price policy, or political influence, or
employment practices, or membership relations or whatever. For
some purposes of investigation, but not others, we may wish to
include, restrict our attention to, or exclude, business enterprises,
unions, charitable foundations, universities, churches, mass media,
"non-profit" enterprises or particular industries. Or we may wish
to arrange any of these Alpha Institutions on scales of size of in-
vestment, or sales, or degree of centralization of management,
number of employees or members, geographic distribution, or any
other convenient standard. Only through use of groupings of con-
scious relevance to our particular interest at hand, can we inquire
into, or say anything Mignificant about these institutions, or the
groups of human actors working through them.
We shall make no progress in this direction so long as we try to
categorize the assertedly threatening institutions by one of their
least relevant aspects-their legal form as "corporations."
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Power?
By conventional argument, the large corporation is a reservoir
of vast Power. Since Power corrupteth, and Freedom prospers only
in a pluralistic environment, the situation is pregnant with danger.
There are a good many dangers in even discussing problems in
terms of "Power." "Power" is a fever spot in all jurisprudential
and political writing, forever breaking out with its aggravants
"authority" and "sovereignty." Sometimes it appears as a descrip-
tive term expressing an estimated potential of achievement, as in
"horsepower." Sometimes it is a general policy prescription, as in
the "federal commerce power." Sometimes it states a legal conclu-
sion in the Hohfeldian sense, as in "the agent had the power to
sign his principal's check." In its Latin armor of ultra vires,
"power" has for centuries bedeviled the corporation lawyer and
only quite lately been discovered to have been a noisy nothing all
along. And always it tends to shift and dodge among these and
other uses without warning to the reader-or the writer. We
should all be better off if the word were outlawed absolutely, on
pain of reading the complete works of Von Gierke.
But the major objection to current discussions of "Power" in
the corporate context is not ambiguity and shifting usage, serious
though that is. A more serious difficulty lies again in the level of
abstraction at which the discussion is carried on.
The Corporate Power thesis conceives of Power as though it
were Mercantilist gold bullion-physically piled on someone's desk,
infinitely fungible unit for unit, and indifferently expendable to
achieve any result. Yet all our experience is squarely to the con-
trary. Power to do A is not power to do B. The management of
a particular company may be so free of shareholder control that
it can pay itself salaries beyond the dreams of avarice. Here is
power indeed; but what may be inferred from it as to that manage-
ment's power to do other things? Can it control prices?-elect a
Senator-prevent its workers from voting-secure the passage of
a constitutional 25% income tax limit-beat a union strike-or
even stop dividend payments? We don't know. On the other hand,
a management that can muster the economic leverage to peg a
market price may or may not be under iron stockholder control,
may or may not have any substantial political influence, may or
may not be at the mercy of a stronger union, and may or may not
have to turn over the bulk of its earnings to a retired patentee
rocking on his veranda at Cannes.
We cannot deduce any of these facts. We can only ask the ques-
tions one at a time, then go find out. Except as poetry, "Power"
is not usable in the gold bullion sense. Power becomes a usable
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analytic conception only when used in a complete statement-a
statement of someone's power to do something, affecting someone
in some way. Without an infinitive, "Power" is a bell without a
clapper.
Power to do one thing may sometimes, of course, be used to
acquire power to do another. Cleopatra's case springs to mind.
The railroad managers were once able to use their economic power
to buy legislators outright-though it is interesting to observe
that they could then think of no other use for the political power
than to make money, thus producing a kind of closed-system power
exchanger. And, conversely, many have discovered the elixir that
converts political power to gold. But though Power Number 1
may sometimes be used to achieve Power Number 2, there is no
automatic equivalence whatever. Whether General Motors' man-
agement controls the Michigan or the Mississippi or the federal
legislature cannot be inferred from an ascertained power of Gen-
eral Motors' management to set auto prices, or even from its
greater power to set styles in fashion, or to shape the investment
rate of the economy. Power is differentiated, not homogeneous;
individuated, not fungible; particularized, not general.
The preceding paragraphs say only what is obvious. But obvi-
ousness has never been a guarantee of adoption. Failure to use
rudimentary rigor in the use of the idea of Power corrupts much
of the comment passing current on the topic of the modern business
enterprise. It is in large part the premise of fungible power that
seduces us into believing that the public has less to fear when
managements are responsive to the control of-are under the
Power of-shareholders. The same false premise produces the
notion of "Countervailing Power"-the cheering prognosis that
public protection from misuse of concentrated managerial Power
will accrue from the countering Power of other large organizations.
In fact, so far as consumer protection is concerned, the strong
union and the strong management are more apt to jam production,
then join to kick the wage-price spiral, than to protect the rest
of the public. And every cartel demonstrates that organizations
of Power may prefer to cooperate than to countervail. As for the
protection of the individual, history yields small ground for con-
fidence that the interests of the individual member of an organiza-
tion will be at one with that of the organizational bureaucracy con-
trolling the uses to which the organization's Power is put.3 On
first reading it seems plausible enough that Power will counter
3. In addition to the analytic weaknesses of the notion of countervailing organi-
zational power, there remains at the end the fundamental but seldom asked question
whether-assuming the mechanism works as advertised-we want basic social policy
decisions to be arrived at this way, and why.
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Power. It sounds comfortably like Montesquieu. But to the re-
splendent abstraction "Power" add a couple of lowly infinitives:
Union Power (to win an organization strike) will check Manage-
ment's Power (to control a monopoly price). The plausible becomes
the ridiculous. The shining garb of Power is revealed as having no
Emperor in it.
Yet the most serious objection to discussing our topic in terms
of "Power" is not emptiness. The real vice is that it stifles exam-
ination of the real questions of substantive policy. In any society,
important economic and political decisions must be made and some-
one has to make them. The tough problem is how to allocate deci-
sion-making power on particular kinds of issues to the persons
or institutions most likely to exercise it to produce the policy re-
sults we want. The management of Continental Can, or an indi-
vidual proprietor, may be in a position to close a plant and wreck
a town. That's a power to decide something all right. But in say-
ing this, we have said nothing. The real questions are: Who should
make this decision? What policy standards should be set to guide
the decision? What, if anything, should be done to ameliorate the
consequences? These are highly specific policy questions requiring
specific answers. We will not even find out what these questions
are if we halt inquiry at the point announcing that Continental
Can, or the individual proprietor, has "Power."
It is not "Power" we fear, but the power to effectuate particular
policies to which we object. The question is-what are they and
who is in a position to carry them out. Until we find out, we can-
not design defenses.
The question is not Power; it is policy.
4
Individual Freedom?
Something general must be said of "Freedom" preliminary to
discussing it in the corporate context. The next stretch of road
takes us through a stretch of politico-jurisprudential swamplands
where it is easy to lose one's way, and floundering, sink forever
from the sight of men. We shall drive fast to be the sooner out.
More often than not, whatever the context, "Freedom infringed !"
is an evocative bugle call and is intended as little more. One may
not quarrel with this usage-it is essential only that the hearer
identify it as such. But if, by a statement about infringement of
freedom, we desire to inform a listener of what is going on, we
4. When a threat has been identified, it is frequently essential to step in to
break up the source before the threat becomes actions. In this sense we must be
concerned at "power," or potentiality, but the need for advance preventive action
heightens, rather than diminishes, the need for clear identification of what it is
that is feared.
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find that we require a quite complex statement. A complete, or
well-formed, statement of this kind involves at least five steps or
components: (i) there must be an actor to do the infringing; (ii)
the actor must be in a position to take an identified action, and
either do it or threaten to do it; (iii) there must be an identified
victim or group of victims; (iv) some special field of the victim's
activities must be designated-to indicate in what respect he will
be victimized; and (v) the speaker must be shocked by the conse-
quences under the circumstances and expect, or hope, that others
will be equally shocked.
Consider the First Amendment language: "Congress shall make
no law .. a bridging the freedom of speech. .. ." With unparal-
leled economy, these ten words give us four of the five needed com-
ponents. The actor is Congress. The act is legislation. The victim
is not identified; here is the missing element (perhaps omitted
deliberately) and potential litigation is left to decide whether the
language covers citizens only, everybody, non-resident aliens,
minors, etc. The affected, or sensitive, field of activity of the victim
is speech. Finally, the mandatory form of statement, and its in-
clusion in the Bill of Rights, bespeak the special importance
normatively assigned to this particular set of events.
Conversely, an informative statement about an infringement of
freedom of speech calls for these same elements. A full statement
would take the form. for example: "(i) Congress (ii) has passed
a law forbidding (iii) strikers (iv) from picketing with placards,
and (v) under the circumstances, I am shocked and say this is an
invasion of a 'freedom'-namely, freedom of speech,-and I urge
you to think so too."
In normal usage, of course, we do not talk in such a formal and
careful way. So long as we are dealing in a familiar environment
with others equally familiar with it, we are able to assume many
things without having to state them expressly. We know that our
listener in the same culture is making roughly the same assump-
tions, and we are able thus to communicate. In this way, we
normally make many assumptions about the concept of "freedom"
when we talk of it. It is important for present purposes to identify
some of these assumptions of common discourse about "freedom."
In the first place, in the United States the term "freedom" gen-
erally connotes political liberties only. This assumption sets an
immediate frame of reference for the discussion. Within this
frame, -our received political tradition has, by a series of built-in
assumptions, excluded from consideration all but a tiny fraction
of the possibilities for choice, as a check through the five compo-
nents listed above will show.
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(i) Institution acting: Products of 18th Century political theory,
we have first narrowed the problem by assuming that problems
of freedom are problems of relationships between the individual
and Government. We have thereby automatically excluded all other
institutions as sources of infringements. Non-government actors
are said to be "private"-a term that by assumption puts them
outside the range of consideration. Litigation and debate in this
area do not attack the premise that only Government may be a
source of "freedom" infringement; the debate is cast in terms of
whether particular action taken was "in fact," as we are pleased
to call it, "State action." The adequacy of this classical premise is,
of course, being increasingly questioned-as illustrated by the
very symposium of which this paper is a part. But in the past, and
still in emotional connotation, we have been able to assume that
when an American talked of invasion of a "freedom," he was talk-
ing about something the government had done. The infinite number
of possible acting institutions is thus cut down to one.
(ii) Action taken: As has often been remarked in late years,
18th Century Liberalism considered freedom entirely in terms of
protection against interference. Totally alien was the notion that,
in addition to this negative kind of freedom "from," men might
be entitled to a variety of freedoms "to"-freedom to, for example,
fulfill his aspirations for a job, for education, or for a full belly.
By excluding such a concept of affirmative freedoms "to," we have
historically severely restricted the kinds of governmental action
that could be said to constitute a violation of "freedom." Only
negative, or interfering action counts-no argument will be heard
that a man's freedom was violated because the Government failed
to undertake affirmative action. Thus again, the range of possible
"freedoms" is slashed to a fraction of the potential.
(iii) Affected area: The third major way in which we have
hitherto restricted the scope of the topic of freedom is by selecting
out of the full range of all human activities no more than a hand-
ful for apotheosis to the level of freedoms. We have singled out
perhaps a dozen areas of activity we deem of central importance-
speech, press, religion, property, etc.-and leave unprotected against
governmental interference the rest of the thousands of "non-free-
dom" activities that occupy man's day-employment, retirement,
marriage, leisure, study, etc.
(iv) Protected persons: This fourth of our components is the
only one that the classical theory of freedom has left all-inclusive.
Whatever we may have done in practice, we have in our political
theory drawn no lines among groups of Man in recognizing basic
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freedoms. And in our law we have not narrowly restricted protec-
tion to our own national citizens.
(v) Normative consensus: In isolated areas, most notably race
relations, the Nation has been sorely tried, in its search for con-
sensus in interpreting its concepts of "freedom." But the more
remarkable fact is how much consensus there is in the United
States on what "freedom" is-what "freedoms" are to be recog-
nized as entitled to legal protection. It would be shockingly un-
American-indeed unthinkable-to challenge any one of the free-
doms listed in the Bill of Rights; it is only slightly less so to
suggest that the catalogue in the Constitution may not be complete
and should be augmented. Here, in the inherited premises of 18th
Century political philosophy is the deep consensus on basic norms
that makes the emotive shorthand of "freedom" possible in con-
versation among Americans. Without it, "freedom of speech" is
no more a communicating and stirring symbol than "freedom of
recreation."
Although, through common heritage, and through ruthless
philosophic restriction of the possible actors, actions, affected ac-
tivity, persons pkotected and norms adopted, we are able to talk
of "freedom" with other Americans and with the products of other
Western cultures of substantially common traditions, and to do so
with a reasonable likelihood that we will be understood. Whenever
we are unable to draw upon this community of premises-when,
for example, we talk with a person from another culture-our
efforts to discuss "freedom" dissolve in repeated frustrating failure.
Our listener is not filling in the blanks in the same way we are-
and until we bring the conversation down to a specific and concrete
level, communication proves impossible. We return now to the
topic billed.
Corporate Power and Individual Freedom?
Within our shared culture we are able to make reasonably com-
municative and complete statements about out political liberties,
such as "freedom of speech." How far can we now go in putting to-
gether the necessary five components for communicative statements
about Corporate Power and Individual Freedom? Comparison is
helpful.
(i) Institution acting: The First Amendment identifies an acting
human institution, Congress. By constrast, as the first segment of
this piece is at some pains to develop, "corporation" has only a
legal form as a referent, and leaves us with no identifiable acting
institution as a subject.
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If, by hidden assumption, "corporation" is to be taken to mean
"large business enterprise," a step toward identification has been
taken, but we are left with no particularization either of the
characteristics of the enterprise that underlie the classification,
or what group is operating through it.
(ii) Action taken: The First Amendment forbids Congress to
take particular identifiable action-forbids it to make a law; the
Amendment also squarely takes sides in favor of the view that
Freedom is freedom "from" interference. No information on either
of these points is provided us by statements to the effect that
corporations threaten because they have "power." Such statements
do not help us decide what it is we do not want an institution to do,
or how to go about blocking it, or what it is we want the institu-
tion to do, or how to go about stimulating it. Here bears the second
part of this article.
(iii) Area affected: The First Amendment, with a subject and
a verb, also specifies the area of sensitivity concerned-free ex-
pression of opinion. The reader knows what we are worried about,
and the acting institution has some guide for action. Talk of the
dangers of "corporate power," already handicapped by having no
subject and no verb, further diminishes the likelihood of communi-
cation by simply omitting this essential reference to the respect in
which someone is adversely affected.
(iv) Persons protected: Though the First Amendment is an
incomplete statement in not specifying who is covered by it, some
general guidance on its coverage may be drawn from its place in
the federal Constitution, and from the fact that it is Congress that
is restricted. When we turn to "corporate power," however, we are
given no lead at all, express or implied, as to who it is we are
worried about. Several possibilities spring to mind-customers of
the business enterprise, employees, executives, junior executives,
shareholders, some classes of shareholders, suppliers, creditors,
some classes of creditors, other institutional bodies such as the
legislatures, the churches, the schools, the press, etc. The nature
and the intensity of our concern about each of these will vary.
Without specification, however, we remain quite uninformed of
whose ox is being gored.
(v) Normative consensus: Freedom is Policy writ large-a
policy sufficiently familiar, understood, and agreed to, that we can
talk about it in monosyllables. When we try to talk of individual
freedom and corporate power, we are laboring under double diffi-
culty. When we speak only of "power" we have no idea what
policies are at stake. But we are little further along even when we
particularize with something like: "It violates a worker's freedom
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of employment if the management of a large enterprise does not
find other employment for him after a plant shutdown," or "It
violates a Negro worker's freedom of employment for an employer
to discriminate racially in hiring." These statements communicate
as sentences; but they lead us, not into an area of normative con-
sensus where We may talk in shorthand of "freedom," but into
the thick of the most hotly contested, divisive issues in contem-
porary economic and political debate.
• • * * * , • * • , * * *
The conclusion seems to me inescapable that in our present pos-
ture of knowledge, analysis and disagreement, we are far from
ready to deal with anything so abstract as the asserted Problem
of Corporate Power and Individual Freedom. We have none of the
necessary elements under intellectual control. We cannot categorize
the actors-cannot say what they do or do not do that is contrary
to our desires-do not know who is affected--do not know in what
respect they are affected-and have no common set of norms or
criteria by which to judge whether we think particular results are
good or bad-or how intensely we feel about it. Every link in this
chain vies to be the weakest.
When we do not know what the problems are, we are hardly
in a position to Constitutionalize about it.
The point -must not be misunderstood as a license to complacency
or as d defense of the status quo. The American economy is growing
more and more out of its ideological clothes. The simple categories
of laissez faire and primitive socialism, neatly dividing "govern-
mental" and "private," are absurdly inadequate to cope descrip-
tively with large enterprise of today. The rules, the vocabulary, the
inherited symbols are all awry.
We talk, and sometimes even act, as though General Motors were
a private person, as for example in the area of charitable contribu-
tions. We talk solemnly of the entrepreneurial risks of corporate
management and the necessary consequent rewards, in a world
where corporate managers come up through a kind of snug interior
civil service more security oriented-and more secure-than that of
the Prussian postoffice. We proclaim the advantage of "private"
contracting out of defense work by the Government, when a $45
billion defense budget turns much of the economy into a kind of
job shop for the Government-a monumental re-creation of the
cottage industrial system. Through Government we subsidize, guar-
antee, reguarantee, finance, provide security for, regulate, control,
manage, price support, and economically dominate whole segments
of that part of the economy we call "private." It suits our fancy
to talk of negotiations between Big Steel and Big Steel Union as
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just another example of Mr. White and Mr. Green bargaining over
the price of Blackacre. We describe shareholders as "owners" of
enterprises and managers as hired hands and insist that share-
holders are an electorate. We seem mainly intent upon making our-
selves ludicrous before the rest of the world by grimly insisting
upon a verbal orthodoxy of "capitalism" that bears increasingly
little resemblance to our own industrial system.
Our modern economic organization surrounds us with serious
policy problems-most of which we undoubtedly do not yet discern.
Is the present allocation of industrial decision-making producing
an adequate capital accumulation and production growth rate? Is
it yielding a socially desirable mix of products? Is the hereditary
epilepsy of the business cycle under adequate control? What can
be done to offset the present accidental power of managers of
publicly held manufacturing enterprises to use their King-of-the-
Hill position to pay themselves, in the name of "Entrepreneur," on
a scale with which government, the professions, educational organi-
zations, the military, the sciences and social service agencies cannot
compete-to the consequent distortion of talent and skill allocation
throughout the economy? How can we provide for equal economic
opportunity for all? What can be done to moderate and spread the
losses of exploding technology on suddenly obsoleted communities
or skill groups without committing the economy to sure and fatal
stagnation? How do we work out an integrated and coordinated
clearing house to prevent atomistic health, welfare and security
plans from clotting the flow of a mobile manpower pool. What can
be done to inhibit, and equitably allocate the costs of, irresponsible
use of bankrupted central cities as dumping grounds for the social
problems of industrially imported labor unconditioned to an urban
environment? How can we integrate our domestic and foreign
economic activities-each as an extension of the other? It is hardly
difficult to add to this list.
Still, American society has been coping with threats from its
own industrial machine for a long time. We have a pretty good
record of meeting new pains with new remedies. Administrators
and courts are engaged in daily counterattack against price rig-
ging, monopoly and unfair competition. Where investors were
found duped, securities regulation arose. Bilking by false labeling
and adulterated goods led to pure food and drug laws and stand-
ards. In the age of steel and steam, labor maimed, children and
women sweated, company-store scrip paid on delayed paydays,
unions smashed as against the laws of nature, epidemic unemploy-
ment-each in turn generated legislative counteraction. Again,
this list is easier to extend than to cut off.
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Some of these older problems are today under fair control; others
are clearly not. They are listed merely as a reminder that the
problem of coping with "corporate power" is hardly new in this
country-and that where we have isolated the particular problems
and brought them to public attention, we have been able to move
against them. One so disposed could have viewed any of these prob-
lems as problems of infringed "freedoms" of corporate "constit-
uents": freedom of enterprisers to compete, freedom of investors to
know, freedom of customers to buy in peace of mind, or freedom
of workers to lead a healthy life of self-respect. But calling these
groups by political analogues like "constituents," and labelling their
problems "freedoms," would do little to move things along. Noth-
ing could be done to work out countermeasures until the facts were
developed on who was hurting whom and how.
Wherein do we gain by importing into analysis of the new
Alpha Institutions old preconceptions of "freedom" from the spe-
cial historical context of American government? We are certain
to raise temperatures by it. We are certain to look for the wrong
problems. We are certain to become unwarrantedly excited when
we detect an accidental area of overlap such as appeared in Marsh
v. Alabama.5 We are certain to impose a narrower get of defini-
tions than the situation demands. And we are certain to throw
virtually insurmountable obstacles in the path of communication.
When norms are most jumbled and disputed the dangers of emotive
analogy are at their greatest-and the need for specificity at its
most urgent.
Concentration, not on Corporate Power and Individual Freedom,
but upon particular acting institutions, particular acts, particular
victims, and particular injuries will continue to produce for us
usable policy solutions. In time, enough instances and enough
solutions taken together may enable us to put together a new
general theory of the relationship of men to groups of men, and
to break out of the mental match boxes into which Locke and
Marx would put us. At such time, with a set of new institutional
arrangements hand-built to accommodate the Demipublic Alpha
Institution, we may find that we have not only learned how to cope
with the Alpha Institution. We may also have helped ourselves
to a better theory of Individual Freedom and Government.
5. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
